This study discusses the existence of the optimal diversification to maximize bank value. It finds that the impact of diversification on bank value depends on the business cycle. Since diversification can lower individual risk and raise system risk simultaneously, it will not always be beneficial for financial institutions to diversify their assets fully. This paper finds that, in a good economy, there will be an optimal diversification to maximize a bank's value, but in a bad economy, diversification will hurt a bank's value. Empirical evidence from Taiwan's banks is provided.
that take advantage of economies of scope, such as the integration of marketing channels and operating strongholds after product diversification, can increase corporate efficiency (Penrose, 1959) . Moreover, the integration of legal and financial resources can be improved by using diversified business operations (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Bodnar et al., 1999) . Using the perspective of the market power theory, Villalonga (2000) proposed three reasons why enterprises choose investment diversification to increase market power: (1) to use a company's profits to offset the price-cutting competition of another; (2) to ally with other companies to compete with rivals in multiple markets; and (3) to crowd out smaller firms by investing in major enterprises to expand market share.
On the other hand, diversification has its costs. Wagner (2010) argued that portfolio diversification increases opportunities for asset overlap. Under the influence of the wealth effect, a bank failure would decrease the wealth of another bank that holds the same assets, leading to further collapse and the possibility of systematic crisis. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) suggested that, under the influence of wealth effect, international portfolio diversification would trigger international "risk infection" since bad news in one country would reduce investors' wealth, resulting in rising risk aversion and disinclination to invest in other countries. Allen and Carletti (2006) and Allen and Gale (2005) argued that the credit risk transfer effect between the insurance and banking industries would lead to risk transfer from the insurance industry to the banking industry. When the banking and the insurance industry hold the same assets, the insurance industry may lower prices in order to sell the assets in times of crisis, harming the banking industry that holds the same assets. If the loss expands to a certain level, bank failures can result.
Diversification may also result in increasing agency problems and increasing corporate costs (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Meyer et al., 1992) , and inefficient resource allocation may arise from the functional failure of internal capital markets (e.g., Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000a; Rajan et al., 2000) . In addition, information asymmetry between investment companies and managers of the companies in which they invest (e.g., Harris et al., 1992 ) is detrimental to business operations since information asymmetry may increase the rent-seeking behaviors of the managers and enable them to engage in non-productive profit-seeking activities (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 2000b) , increasing corporate costs and lowering corporate value.
Despite the competing positive and negative effects of diversification, studies on optimal diversification are rare. This study attempts to determine the conditions necessary for an optimal level of diversification to exist using the banking industry as an example. The study follows the model Wagner (2010) used to explore the effect of diversification in reducing individual risk and increasing system risk. We find that optimal diversification is related to the business cycle: When the economy is good, there is an optimal diversification level for maximizing banks' value, and when the economy is bad, diversification will lower bank value.
Other literature has focused on why banks undertake diversification. For example, Acharya (2001) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005) indicated that banks hold affiliated assets because they do not consider the system risk cost. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007; 2008) argued that banks expect the possibility of simultaneous crises to increase, so the authorities have to save them in time of crisis. There have been no empirical studies on optimal diversification. This study uses Taiwan's banks to conduct empirical tests of optimal diversification. Our findings suggest that an optimal level of diversification does exist in Taiwan's banking samples, possibly because of the boom conditions of Taiwan's banking industry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, which uses the business cycle to determine the optimal diversification to maximize banks' value. Using Taiwan's banking industry as an example, Section 3 tests the impact of diversification on the banks' value. Section 4 offers conclusions, integrates the theoretical and empirical results, and proposes suggestions for future studies.
The Model
Wagner (2010) pointed out that diversification affects corporations in two ways: by reducing individual corporate risk in order to enhance corporate value and by increasing system risk to lower corporate value. Therefore, full diversification is not necessarily the best solution. This paper attempts to determine the conditions necessary for an optimal level of diversification to exist.
To derive the optimal degree of diversification in the banking system we follow the framework used in Wagner (2010). Consider a three-period economy and two banks. Suppose each bank has collected one unit of funds from investors, of which a share d is in the form of deposits and the remaining share is capital. At time 1 bank 1 invests in an asset X , and bank 2 invests in an asset Y . Each asset requires one unit of funds. The values of the assets are independent and uniformly distributed on the interval [0, ] s ; that is 
Therefore, the total welfare in the economy is the sum of the expected values of bank 1 and 2:
.
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E v r is independent of i r , the optimal diversification simply minimizes the total expected liquidation losses at both banks. Because of symmetry, the optimal degrees of diversification for banks 1 and 2 are equal. Therefore, we can focus on the losses for bank 1 and solve
Using these assumptions, the optimal degree of diversification can be derived.
Proposition 1. The optimal degree of diversification in the banking system is given by
, and
Proof. See Appendix A. Unlike Wagner (2010), who showed that the optimal degree of diversification is 1 1 2 1 q   , we find that the optimal degree diversification depends on the probability
. When the probability of liquidation is less than or equal to 1 1 2 1 q   , the optimal degree of diversification is consistent with that of Wagner (2010). However, when the probability of liquidation is more than 1 1 2 1 q   , the optimal degree of diversification is 0.
In the Nash equilibrium, the degree of diversification for Bank 1 is solved by
which leads to Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. In the Nash equilibrium the degree of diversification in the banking
sector is given by
Proof. See Appendix B. Unlike Wagner (2010), who showed that the equilibrium degree of diversification is 1 1 q  , we find that the equilibrium degree diversification depends on the probability
. When the probability of liquidation is less than or equal to 1 1 q  , the optimal degree of diversification is consistent with Wagner (2010).
However, when the probability of liquidation is more than 1 1 q  , the optimal degree of diversification is 0.
is the probability of liquidation, it is reasonable to assume that the value of ( d s ) depends on the business cycle. When the economy is good (bad) and opportunities for profitable investments increase (decrease), the highest possible value of bank assets increases (decreases) and ( d s ) falls (rises).
The threshold of optimal diversification is related to the cost of liquidation by outsiders q . In this study, the threshold of the optimal diversification is 1 1 2 1 q   in general equilibrium and 1 1 q  in the Nash equilibrium. The cost of liquidation by outsiders q is suggested to be constant in the short term, which implies that the threshold would also be constant in the short term. The implications of our results are as follows:
a. An optimal diversification is more likely to exist in a good economy than in a bad economy. When the economy is good, the highest value of the bank assets s is higher than when the economy is bad; hence, the probability of liquidation ( d s ) is likely to be less than the threshold, and there is an optimal level of diversification to maximize banks' value is more likely to exist.
b. In case a bad economy, more diversification lowers bank value. When the economy is bad, the highest value of the bank's assets s is lower, so the probability of liquidation ( d s ) is likely to be higher than the threshold and to lead to a lower bank value when there is more diversification.
Empirical Results
Using Taiwan's banking industry as an example, this section tests whether an optimal level of diversification can exist and, if it does, under what conditions. Because the financial systems of emerging markets are not mature and changes in financial structure are dramatic, the banking industry's cyclic fluctuations are apparent. Since the demands for funds from banks are relatively high, the fluctuations in the banking industry could easily have an overall impact. In addition, the market value of listed banks in Taiwan accounts for a relatively large percentage of the total market, and the high level of financial integration includes banking; hence, diversification is an important subject for Taiwan's banking industry and worth examination.
Sample
We chose 33 publicly listed banks in Taiwan from TEJ (Taiwan Economic Journal) data bank as the screening group, based on the length of their history and the availability of data. We excluded banks that were merged into financial holding companies because of difficult access to data and their reduced business independence.
Then we selected banks from this group whose business cycle was apparent (equity market capitalization had once been lower than book value, namely, Tobin's q value was <1) and whose levels of diversification had fluctuated. After this screening, we were left with ten publicly listed banks and 120 monthly observations for each year from 2000 to 2009. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the corporate value indicator (Tobin Q) and the diversification indicator (Herfindal H) in our sample. As Table 1 shows, the corporate value indicator (Tobin's q) and diversification indicator (Herfindal H) have no apparent relationship in the sample, the banks' Q and H values have no relevant relationships in terms of rising or falling with changes in the sample, and the average value and variance are in the similar situation.
Optimum Diversification
This section describes the effect of diversification on bank value in order to test whether an optimal level of diversification exists that can maximize the value of the bank. The following section discusses the selection of the proxy indicators for bank value and diversification, and the testing model of the optimal diversification.
Value Index Tobin's Q
We use Tobin's q as a measure of bank valuation. Tobin's q is calculated as the sum of the market value of common equity, plus the book value of preferred shares, plus the book value of total debt, divided by the book value of total assets. Lang and Stulz (1994) employed Tobin's q to observe the relationship between corporate diversification and performance, arguing that Tobin's q contains the capitalized value of diversification. Under the hypothesis of an efficient market and market value as the unbiased estimated value of the current cash flow of the company, Tobin's q can measure the contributions of the intangible assets of the company to market value.
Hence, management activities (e.g., diversification) can increase or decrease corporate value through the impact of intangible assets. When the company's investment portfolio changes, its Tobin's q will also change.
Most of the recent studies related to diversification use Tobin's q and relevant indicators to measure the relationship between the value of financial institutions and diversification (Elsas et al., 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Whited, 2001 ). Most of the modifications related to Tobin's q are based on changes in business operational activities after the establishment of financial holding companies.
However, sample banks selected for the present study do not include financial holding companies, so this study uses Tobin's q to measure changes in corporate value in order to explore the impact of diversification on corporate value.
Diversification Index
When the diversification indicator is calculated from the perspective of the bank's profitability, the profit-making activities are divided into interest-rate-related activities and non-interest-rate-related activities. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
Regression Model
This section tests the impact of diversification on corporate value in order to verify the existence of an optimal level of diversification in the sample banks in Taiwan.
Tobin's q is used as the measurement indicator of the value of the bank, and H is used as the diversification indicator of the bank's revenue to establish the regression model: If the operational purpose of the bank is to maximize its value (Max Q), and there is an optimal level of diversification H, then H should satisfy the following two conditions:
, Second-order condition, namely, H 2 regression coefficient a 2 <0, representing that the existence of diversification has maximized corporate value.
Condition II,
The optimum diversification:
; hence, the regression coefficient is a 1 >0.
Test Results
If the effects of reducing individual risk through the bank's diversification are greater than the effects of increasing system risk, there should be an optimal level of diversification to maximize the value of the bank. This paper uses the corporate value Q of Taiwan's sample banks to conduct a regression estimation of the diversification variables H and H 2 , leading to the results shown in Table 2 . Tobin's q is calculated as the sum of the market value of common equity, plus the book value of preferred shares, plus the book value of total debt, divided by the book value of total assets. Herfindal H=1-[(interest revenue/total revenue) 2 +(handling fee and handling charge commission revenue/total revenue) 2 +(financial transaction revenue/total revenue) 2 +(other revenue/total revenue) 2 ]. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
As Table 2 shows, the regression coefficients of the first-order variable H of diversification against the bank value variable Q at the 1% significance level is positive, indicating that increasing diversification leads to rising corporate value. The regression coefficients of the second-order variable H 2 of diversification at the 1% significance level are mostly positive except for one sample, indicating that diversification can maximize corporate value. Hence, Taiwan's banking sample suggests that diversification's positive effects on bank value (reducing individual risk)
are greater than the negative effects (increasing system risk).
Regarding the impact of economic conditions on the optimal level of diversification, this study organizes the probability of corporate value to be lower than liability value in conducting the sensitivity analysis and finds no significant results. It is not easy to estimate accurately the loss probability q and the observation value s of the highest possible value of the bank's investment assets. Therefore, this question is expected to be explored in future studies. Among the sample banks in Taiwan, the Taichung Commercial Bank (2812) and the Kaohsiung Bank (2836) have higher risks (risk incidents had taken place) than other banks. The probability of liquidation conditions of the two samples, the d /s values, are more likely to exceed the threshold, so an optimal level of diversification is less likely. However, the regression fitness of the two samples is relatively poor (relatively smaller modified R 2 ), and the representativeness is weak. The probability of the liquidation condition indicator, the d/s value of other sample banks, is more likely to exceed the threshold; hence, the possibility that there is an optimal level of diversification in Taiwan's banking industry is relatively high.
Conclusions
There are many explanations for the benefits of diversification in financial institutions.
Most of the early literature contended that diversification could improve corporate value. From the risk perspective, the most widely accepted explanation is that it can lower the average risk of the portfolio. However, using the viewpoint of risk there is an optimal level of diversification to maximize corporate value. This study finds that diversification's impact on corporate value is related to the business cycle such that, when the economy is good, there is an optimal level of diversification to maximize banks' value, and when the economy is bad, diversification will hurt banks'
value. Moreover, the optimal level of diversification and the loss rate are in an inversely changing relationship. These results suggest that the integration effect of diversification in good economies are beneficial, and investment should increase, while the integration effects of diversification are negative in poor economies, and investment should be reduced.
Most of the recent empirical studies on the impact of diversification on the value of financial institutions begin from the perspective of financial integration to test whether corporate value falls after financial integration. Such limitations are not generalized. Hence, with Taiwan's banks as an example, this study tests the impact of diversification on the banks' value and finds that, in the case of the sample banks, there is an optimal level of diversification to maximize corporate value. This finding suggests that Taiwan's economic conditions still benefit the diversification of the banking industry. However, this study does not verify the indicators of conditions leading to probability of liquidation or loss rate, which may be considerations for future study. Since in region I, r is restricted to be between / d s and 1/2, the optimal diversification in region I is 
